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Abstract 
 
 Specifics of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 compel at least one assessment 
to be given in high school, but it remains the duty of each state to decide how and when 
to administer that and other standardized assessments.  Some states have chosen to 
require proficient performance on standardized tests in order to receive a high school 
diploma, and such a policy is more commonly known as an exit examination.  In this 
project I address the following question: under which forms of state education 
governance do states choose to adopt a standardized high school exit exam?  In this 
research I explore both how the bureaucratic structure of state education governance and 
the role of partisan politics may impact the creation and establishment of education 
policy.  Results reveal that centralized governance has a negligible impact on exit 
examination policy but partisan control - specifically Democratic partisan control - is 
strongly correlated with the presence of exit examination policy. Implications and further 
applications of this research are discussed in the concluding section of the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
Introduction 
 
Standardized testing is the most widely used quantitative measure of student 
performance in the United States.  As an expected consequence, the testing industry 
overall has grown to reach unprecedented proportions.  Federally mandated policies, 
exemplified most notably by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 [NCLB], have 
required standardized assessments of all public school pupils in the country.  Specifics of 
NCLB compel at least one assessment to be given in high school, but it remains the duty 
of each state to decide how and when to administer this and other standardized 
assessments.  According to Robert Linn (2008: 3), “[a]ssessing high school students 
poses greater challenges than assessing elementary and middle school students because of 
the often substantial differences in course taking patterns of high school students.”  Yet 
of the 50 states, 30 have thus far elected to administer a standardized test that explicitly 
bases the ability of a student to graduate upon performing at a state-defined level of 
proficiency.  The policy of mandating a certain level of assessment performance in order 
to receive a high school diploma is more commonly referred to as an exit examination.  
An exit examination may take one of many forms, testing a variety of subjects or 
influencing a student’s ability to graduate by determining the awarding of credits or 
singlehandedly regulating social promotion to the next grade level.  Exit examinations, 
despite their variations across states, nonetheless all have in common the fact that they 
directly impact a student’s ability to receive a high school diploma. 
For the purposes of this study, the 30 states mentioned above refer to all states 
that have passed an exit examination policy at some point in their history, regardless of 
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whether that policy is still active.1  Figure 1 indicates the prevalence of these policies 
across the United States where they have been passed.  
**Figure 1 Here** 
States have traditionally been at the helm of education policy in the United States2 
but there exists considerable variance in how each state establishes its education 
governance structures.  Paul Manna and Timothy Harwood (2011) demonstrate this 
variance by examining the respective roles of the governor, the state chief of education, 
and the state board of education within each state.  I intend to expand this research by 
focusing on high-stakes education policies in particular3 and the role of partisan politics 
(Republican or Democratic) within these policies.  Specifically, I seek to determine under 
which of the aforementioned conditions – nature of education governance and nature of 
political leanings – states are more likely to adopt a standardized exit exam as part of 
their education policy agenda. 
 
Since their inception in Florida in 1976, exit examinations as a policy trend have 
grown steadily and linearly (see Figure 2).  Between the years of 1976-2012, state leaders 
                                                
1  The term “exit examination” refers only to a standardized test that requires students to reach 
proficiency in order to receive their high school diploma.  States without an exit examination 
policy might use their high school standardized test results for district interventions or merely as a 
data source to report state progress to the federal government.  Utah and North Carolina are the 
only two states that have rescinded their exit examination policy after having passed it.  
2  The United States Constitution does not define a federal role for education leadership and 
explains, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  States, therefore, have 
absolute power to govern education as long as they do not infringe upon Constitutional mandates 
or federal law. 
3  The term “high-stakes” refers to any policy with consequences for students, teachers, or schools.  
Many examinations are used exclusively for data purposes, such as district diagnostic skills and 
school board reporting figures, and are not high-stakes.   An exit exam, because students must 
perform at or above a certain standard in order to receive their high school diploma, is high-stakes. 
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enacted an average of one new exit examination policy every 1.2 years.4  While the 
consistency in exit examination growth history suggests continued adoption of these 
policies throughout the other states, my research centers on the policy environment of the 
states that have thus far led the charge.  Based on the research results, it may be possible 
to predict future patterns in state exit examination policy adoption.  If certain 
characteristics of governance and partisanship appear to be strongly correlated with exit 
examination policy, then it will be possible to articulate a relationship between these 
variables and chart a likely course for future United States exit examination policy 
activity. 
**Figure 2 Here** 
Exit examinations are particularly salient in current debates concerning standards 
and accountability, as they reflect the progress of a much larger trend in education.  The 
term “high-stakes” applies not only to exit examinations but also extends to teacher 
hiring and firing practices, college eligibility, and district-wide sanctions.  Furthermore, 
all states have established specific graduation requirements of their public high school 
students, but exit examinations are among a small number of quantitative graduation 
metrics available to states.  Results of my research, therefore, have salient implications 
for the progress of state education accountability policy in general and the political 
environments friendly to high-stakes quantitative student measurement in particular. 
 
 
 
                                                
4 This research does not explore the structural and partisan environments of states that have 
proposed but never enacted an exit examination.  Only states that have passed exit examination 
policy are considered in this specific project. 
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Research Question 
 
 Stated concisely, the question this report seeks to answer is: within which 
organizational structures and political environments do state education leaders choose to 
adopt a standardized high school exit examination?  Addressing this question requires 
first examining the existing literature on state education governance centralization and 
partisanship. 
 
Literature and Theory – Education Governance Centralization 
 
There is a spectrum of education governance structures among the states, ranging 
from exclusive appointment to exclusive election of certain key officials.  In the former 
model, the electorate is involved in choosing the governor, but beyond that point the 
governor is privy to appointing the members of the State Board of Education [SBOE] as 
well as appointing the Chief State School Officer [CSSO], who in turn oversees the State 
Education Agency [SEA].5, 6  This model represents the strongest degree of centralization 
existing in the United States.  The latter model, conversely, reflects the opposite extreme 
of decentralization.  The most decentralized model available in this study is one in which 
                                                
5  Depending on the state, the CSSO might be called the Superintendent of Education, the 
Commissioner of Education, the Secretary of Education, or another title.  Occasionally the CSSO 
operates in conjunction with the Secretary of Education, and in these cases I have named as the 
CSSO the principal education leader within a given state’s governance system.  Depending on the 
state, the SEA might be called the Department of Education, the Department of Elementary and 
Secondary Education, or the Department of Public Instruction. 
6 State Legislatures are omitted in my study of centralization despite serving a vital role in 
education policy activity.  First, all state legislatures are elected by the general voting population, 
and therefore do not ever exist as a part of a highly centralized structure.  Second, state 
legislatures do not specialize in education work unlike the CSSO and SBOE. 
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the electorate chooses the governor, the CSSO, and members of the SBOE in separate 
elections.  While these three entities may still interact regularly, the direction of policy 
and power is inevitably more divided by virtue of reduced accountability from one office 
to another. 
Network Theory provides a concise definition of the effects of a centralized 
leadership structure.  As Meier and O’Toole (2000) envision the term, Network Theory 
suggests that the nature of leadership networks can impact state policy outcomes.  
Specifically, leaders are best able to realize their policies when there exists high 
congruence between their priorities and the priorities of their partners.  Within the context 
of state governance, this model applies to the partnership between governors and their 
CSSOs and SBOEs.  In states where governors are able to appoint these other units, 
Network Theory suggests that there is a higher likelihood of overall policy production 
because their priorities are inherently aligned.   
Mokher (2010) explores this theory in more depth in her research on Network 
Theory in the specific context of education.  Her study indicates that governors are 
central to establishing a policy network, and governors with substantial appointment 
powers are particularly suited to this goal.  Her research implies that governors in a 
highly centralized system are not only better suited to propose and communicate their 
policy goals, but their policies overall are less likely to meet opposition along the way 
and are therefore more likely to ultimately pass.  Although policy actors in a 
decentralized system may share priorities and interests, the divided nature of their 
governance network risks delaying or obstructing efficient policy development (Wilson 
1989).  From the work of these scholars, it is apparent that a highly centralized 
 9 
governance system is better suited to both produce and pass policy.   
Literature additionally suggests that governors are, on the whole, able to exercise 
greater control over their state than in previous years (Hershey 2011).  “Control,” in this 
context, translates to a certain degree of command over the direction and progress of 
public policy.  While this particular finding is not necessarily specific to exit examination 
legislation, the research also suggests that gubernatorial leadership is particularly 
pronounced in those states with a more centralized education governance structure.  In 
other words, where governors have a high degree of control over who becomes the CSSO 
and who serves on the SBOE, education leadership should be better able than governors 
in a decentralized state to enact education policy.   
The above body of literature emphasizes that governors are increasingly powerful 
overall, and governors in a centralized system are perhaps even more powerful than their 
decentralized counterparts.  Henig (2009) corroborates Hershey’s research in his article 
on “education executives” – or state-level education leaders.  Specifically, Henig 
articulates two important points regarding education governance trends.  First, the 
governor’s leadership role in education has grown overall, particularly since the 1983 
publication of A Nation At Risk by the National Commission on Excellence in Education.  
This has implications for educational leadership centralization and is reflected in part in 
the sustained growth of exit examination policy across the states.  Second, in those 
instances where executive (in this case, gubernatorial) leadership has been strongest, 
there may be a greater chance that policy enactment will follow general policy discussion.  
Overall, Henig’s (2009) findings take Mokher’s one step further by suggesting increased 
education policy production specifically in those states where governors have 
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considerable appointment powers over their bureaucracies. 
Discussing education policy in particular, Manna and Harwood (2011: 486-487) 
write that “a governor empowered to appoint the state education agency leader and board 
members is likely to enhance accountability by providing a single point for citizens and 
administrative agents in local school districts to focus their concerns.”  Additional 
research reveals some support for the claim that centralized education governance is more 
frequently correlated with accountability policy than decentralized governance 
(McDermott 2003).  These studies suggest that increased education leadership 
cohesiveness enables political actors to promote greater standards and accountability in 
public policy.  Explained differently, highly centralized states may be better positioned 
than their more decentralized counterparts to enact policies with a greater focus on 
accountability.  Exit examination policies, due to their high-stakes nature, fall squarely 
into the category of accountability policies. 
According to a recent Center on Education Policy report, several states that have 
failed to put into practice a statewide exit examination have faced a series of policy 
challenges closely tied to a lack of centralized governance (McIntosh 2012).  Political 
disagreements and changes in state leadership, for example, have hindered the production 
of exit examination policy.  Furthermore, opposition from key education stakeholders 
within the state serves as an additional hurdle (McIntosh 2012: 4).  McIntosh’s study 
lends support to the conclusion that each of these factors – political disagreements, 
changes in state leadership, and opposition from other education stakeholders – is more 
likely to exist in a state lacking a centralized gubernatorial appointment system.  First, 
when a governor is able to appoint other members of state educational leadership, these 
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appointees will likely align with that governor’s policy ideals.  The risk for political 
disagreements, in other words, is greatly reduced by the nature of a centralized 
appointment governance system.  Second, a governor’s appointment ability controls for 
changes in state leadership and opposition from other education stakeholders in the state.  
These factors would, for example, present a much greater risk in a state that holds 
separate elections for the educational leadership parties. 
 
Two principal themes emerge in the extant literature on state governance 
centralization: an increased likelihood of policies passing overall; and an increased 
likelihood for accountability policies specifically, including exit examination policies.  
These notions inform my first hypothesis, which is: 
 
1) States whose governors operate in a highly centralized education 
governance system are more likely than states whose governors operate in 
a less centralized education governance system to enact a standardized 
high school exit examination. 
 
Literature and Theory - Education Governance Partisanship 
 
Partisan politics impact the direction of public policy immensely (Erikson, Wright, 
& McIver 1994).  In discussing the role of partisanship on state exit examination policy 
throughout the states, I first explore the growing nationalization of each party and how it 
influences state-level governance.  A trend of party unification across the states will 
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allow for generalizing findings across the country and will have implications for 
predicting future policy direction within different states.  Second, I present the specific 
policy goals held by the Republican and Democratic parties and form a hypothesis 
relating the influence of partisan state education governance on exit examination policy 
throughout the United States. 
There exists some literature on the role of state partisanship in the United States 
that presumes a greater likelihood for partisan state leaders to identify with state-level or 
regional party concerns before national partisan concerns.  Under this model, it is 
exceptionally difficult to infer the direction of multi-state partisan decisions based on 
results from individual states.  While there exist some compelling findings on this 
localized partisanship theory (Dulio and Nelson 2005: 46) the vast majority of recent 
literature supports the opposing theory, noting in particular a recent behavior of partisan 
state leaders subscribing progressively more frequently to their national party’s beliefs 
(Hershey 2011; Paddock 2005: 187; Berman 2000: 39).  This second theory claims that 
while regional differences exist, partisan state leaders bear more similarities than 
differences across the country.  This model allows for party-wide conclusions throughout 
the United States and thus adds a degree of generalizability to the results of my second 
hypothesis. 
By the end of the 20th century, political parties had begun to aggressively promote 
a national platform as a means of mobilizing a more coherent image of their party and in 
order to target potential voters more effectively (Shober 2010).  Emergent pronounced 
differences between Democratic and Republican voter opinion reflects this trend.  While 
regional variance in political party platforms remains, in recent decades both major 
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parties have actively pursued and promoted their national image.   
Stonecash (2010: 3) writes that “partisanship is on the rise.”  Hedge’s (1998: 55) 
research points to “heightened levels of national-state party integration.”  Similarly, 
Walker (2000) contends that partisan politics have become more nationalized, as opposed 
to more regionalized, since the 1970s.  These trends make possible a multi-state analysis 
of partisan affiliation, because we may assume that Democrats in one state bear 
significant similarities to Democrats in any other state.  The 1970s is an important 
landmark period because the first exit exam legislation in the United States passed in 
Florida in 1976.  Because the Democratic and Republican parties have each assumed a 
more significant national role since the 1970s, it is possible to compare patterns of 
partisan governance across every state that has at some point in its history adopted an exit 
examination policy. 
Liscio and Stonecash (2010) conclude that governance systems united under a 
particular party are best able to enact policy change, which bears considerable similarity 
to much of the centralization outcomes mentioned in the previous section.  This finding 
suggests that in order to increase their chances for passing a given policy, state party 
affiliates are increasingly welcoming the partisan role as set forth by their national party 
affiliates.   
Theories of partisan governance unity (Shober 2010) influence not only the effect 
of a centralized leadership system, but also the effect of partisanship on policy.  Shober 
suggests that significant legislation7 is more likely to pass under a unified government, 
                                                
7  Shober never explicitly defines “significant legislation” but because exit examination policy 
represents high-stakes accountability and impacts the graduation eligibility of all students within 
certain states, it is reasonable to assume that exit examination policy falls within the realm of 
“significant legislation.” 
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which he defines as party congruence among the governor, the state legislature, and the 
CSSO (if elected).  To expand this discussion, I now turn to the policy goals of the 
Republican and Democratic parties. 
Within the Republican Party, there exists a trend in favor of small government 
and placing high levels of deference to state and local leaders (Manna and Harwood 
2011).  Democratic state leadership, conversely, tends to outline more statewide 
guidelines, such as smaller class size (Shober 2012) and higher per pupil spending 
(Fusarelli 2002) for all students under the assumption of equity for all students.  While 
these partisan generalizations are just that – generalizations – it is significant to note these 
distinctions among states when they are supported with robust data from several state 
leaders.   
In Arizona, for example, state Senator Thayer Verschoor (R) cosponsored 
legislation designating the state’s current high school-level standardized test as a 
diagnostic instrument rather than as an exit examination necessary for graduation.  “This 
should not be mandated by big government and a state school board,” he contended 
(FairTest 2005).  Similarly, Texas Education Agency Commissioner Michael Williams 
(R) has invited 23 school districts from around the state to join a consortium that will 
inform the direction of assessments, among other issues.  Williams’ focus on “various 
methods of measuring student progress” and “reliance on local input” (Texas Education 
Agency 2012) imply conflict with an exit examination mandate, as an exit examination 
necessitates one primary measure of student progress and reliance on standards set by the 
state itself. 
On the other end of state education partisanship, Governor Gray Davis (D) in 
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1999 spearheaded a proposal for a California state exit examination.  Throughout his 
tenure as governor, Davis was an outspoken proponent of “legislation to hold schools 
accountable for their performance” (California Office of the Governor 1999).  An exit 
examination proposal fit naturally into this statewide accountability policy.   
Generally speaking, exit examination policy squarely challenges the Republican 
ideals of small government and high local control.  First, establishing an exit examination 
is a mandate that, in addition to risking high implementation costs, inherently requires 
administrative oversight at the state level – or, in other words, an expansion of state 
government.  Second, a statewide exit exam policy necessarily overrides a local district’s 
ability to label its own students as proficient to graduate.   
 
Effectively exploring the influence of partisanship on state exit examination 
policies requires evaluating the partisan affiliation of key players in the state education 
arena.  What follows is a discussion of the growing roles of the governor and the 
legislature8 in state education politics.  The goal of this discussion is to assert that the 
governor and legislature in each state are the two most important partisan participants in 
education policy development, and thus that examining these entities and their partisan 
affiliations will render a conclusive perspective on a given state’s education policy 
environment.  
 The National Governors Association [NGA] writes, “education policy is a 
constitutional responsibility of states, and governors play a leading role in efforts to 
                                                
8 The legislature is included in this portion of my research because partisan identity is often 
central to legislative policy discussions and behavior.  While not limited specifically to education 
policy, state legislatures demonstrate the most overt connection between partisan affiliation and 
policy enactment. 
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improve education” (National Governors Association 2012).  As a part of their response 
to this leading role, the NGA targets support through the NGA Center for Best Practices.  
The center works with governors across the country to provide technical assistance, 
policy analysis, and other types of aid through research and projects (National Governors 
Association 2012).  Through the NGA governors have access to increasing amounts of 
state education data in addition to policy databases in various educational issue areas, 
policy action plans, online portals, and funding for governors to attend NGA events 
focused on a variety of educational policy areas.  Beyond the mere availability of these 
resources, the NGA boasts growing affiliations and projects with individual state 
governors, indicating that the governors themselves are recognizing a substantial 
responsibility in education and pursuing the additional resources available to them in the 
educational policy area. 
Beyond the structural support of the country-wide NGA, in recent years the 
governors in various states have pursued actions that have increased their individual roles 
in education.  A 2011 report by the Education Commission of the States [ECS] reflects 
upon recent policy changes that have allowed governors to more actively engage in, or 
even direct statewide education policymaking.  These changes include increasing 
gubernatorial appointment power, establishing a gubernatorial education advisory board, 
proposing a greater oversight role for a state superintendency, and the consolidation of 
educational leadership entities under partial or full gubernatorial purview (Zinth 2011).  
Governors are heavily involved in education policy overall and this involvement only 
shows signs of expanding. 
Although many of the increases in gubernatorial power have emerged in recent 
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years, the role of the governor in education policy has historically been one of great 
significance.  The term “education governor” garnered noteworthy attention in the 1980s 
in particular, and it evolved from the earlier term “good schools governor” prevalent in 
the beginning of the 20th century (Krotseng 1987: 3-4; Kuralt 1986: 243).  Importantly, 
Krotseng explains that beyond merely serving as a compelling rhetorical title, the concept 
of “education governor” has been consistently and strongly linked to education policy 
outcomes (1987).  Regular and commanding participation in legislative and budgetary 
concerns demonstrates that while governors are not always as central to education policy 
discussion as state legislatures, their role has nonetheless historically proven both 
significant and highly visible.  Governors are thus central to this and other research 
analyzing state policy patterns.   
 
 Exit examinations require a significant financial investment for the development, 
publication, dissemination, and grading processes, and being a state-ordained initiative, 
this investment originates in each state's overall budget.  A major focus of state 
legislatures throughout the United States is reviewing and approving state government 
budgets, so a proper analysis of policy development must necessarily incorporate the role 
of state legislatures. 
 It is unproductive to assume, however, that each state legislature serves a 
comparable function in education policy development and approval, or that these 
intricacies are not relevant to the scope of this research.  A legislature that appoints or 
confirms the members of the state board of education will, of course, possess much 
higher potential for influencing the direction of state education policy than a legislature 
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that is simply responsible for approving the state's education budget (as a portion of the 
overall state government budget).  Rather, it is important to note that all state legislatures 
are involved with at least the budgeting process and therefore ultimately connected to the 
success of exit examination policy.  Despite the possible idiosyncrasies distinguishing the 
state legislatures across the United States, the overarching strength of the state legislature 
and of the governor in the education policy arena remains noteworthy. 
Furthermore, results of a six state comparative study reveal that state legislatures 
are the most influential actors in the educational policy arena overall (Marshall, Mitchell, 
& Wirt 1989).  Key to this conclusion is the notion that the United States political system 
bestows upon the legislatures a certain legitimacy that interest groups and local 
institutions lack.  Added involvement in state budgetary matters renders the governor 
similarly powerful in the education policy arena, since education overall is the single 
largest state expenditure across the board (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt 1989: 32).  Overall, 
both the legislature and governor are vital and central to a state’s public policy 
environment. 
Incorporating each legislature within a larger state education governance metric 
helps to round out the partisan context of all states from 1975 onward.  Due to the 
legislature's inherent role in exit examination policy development, even if not full or 
explicit, it is essential to consider their partisan conditions when attempting to examine 
the link between state party affiliation and the success of exit examination policy. 
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An Addendum: Party Unity 
 
In addition to evaluating the partisan influence on exit examination policy in the 
states according to a Democrat-Republican dichotomy, I will also examine the effect of 
party unity.  Rather than investigating party unity as a separate variable and potential 
hypothesis, I will simply explore the nuance that the literature offers with regard to 
unified versus divided partisan control.  In its bare bones form, party unity refers to those 
instances where all relevant leaders are members of the same party.  Divided leadership, 
conversely, exists where leaders belong to differing parties or exist in a state of split 
representation.  Divided leadership may refer to equal influence of the Republican or 
Democratic parties, or it may refer to leadership that is majority one party but some 
players belong to the opposing party.  In these instances, the state would be labeled 
specifically as being under “divided Democrat” or “divided Republican” control. 
John J. Coleman (1999) offers a model for the study of party unity on a national 
scale, which I have adapted for the state level.  Using gubernatorial and legislative 
partisan affiliation data from 1975-2012, I will be able to test my second hypothesis (see 
below) while additionally using the variables to explicate if and how party unity impacts 
policy development.  The remainder of this section is devoted to assessing available 
literature on party unity and policy, with an emphasis on how party unity is significant in 
discussing the partisan impact on policy passage. 
Partisan politics in the United States refer to a key divide between Democrats and 
Republicans, and because the states are universally and overwhelmingly aligned with 
these two parties, it is important to discuss the interplay between them in areas where 
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both parties hold strong (and perhaps manifestly equal) political presence.  I refer to these 
states as having low party unity because strong interaction between the parties in a state’s 
leadership structure necessarily implies that no one party has obvious or even notable 
control. 
In an attempt to offset one party’s ownership of a particular issue in a low-unity 
state, the other party may “lure” the other into passing a weaker version of the intended 
bill (Gilmour 1995: 38).  The intent of this action is to introduce uncertainty as to which 
party is more likely to dominate a particular issue area, and therefore dominate legislative 
action.  Because Democrats traditionally “own” the issue of education (Egan 2009: 9; 
Goble & Werner 2006: 7), Gilmour’s analysis suggests that a state decidedly dominated 
by Democrats may be able to pass more and stronger education-related bills than a state 
with bipartisan representation or Republican representation.  Mohr (1969) similarly 
asserts that innovative policy is more likely to succeed in a unilateral political 
environment, which corroborates Gilmour’s (1995) and Coleman’s (1999) explorations of 
the effect of unified versus divided government on policy outputs.   
Party labels, it should be mentioned, do not necessarily suggest affiliation with a 
particular ideology.  A study on the proliferation of teacher competency testing policy 
reveals an important methodological distinction from my work (Nice 1993: 40-41).  In an 
effort to narrow the scope of my research I have chosen to focus solely on the political 
labels “Democrat” and “Republican,” and acknowledge but largely ignore the liberal and 
conservative undertones of these parties.  It may behoove future scholars to consider 
some of these ideological intricacies when analyzing the progress of exit examination 
policy throughout the United States, but this research delves into political philosophy; I 
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seek instead to examine the impact of the Democrat and Republican political labels 
purely in a public policy context. 
 In addition to Democrats being more likely than Republicans to promote 
legislative action related to education, it is possible to speculate that a state under united 
Democratic leadership will be more effective than a state under divided partisan 
leadership to produce strong and comprehensive education legislation.  Because exit 
examination policy extends over the domain of every public high school student in the 
state and dips heartily into the state budget (e.g., the costs of developing, printing, 
distributing, collecting, and grading), it is reasonable to assume that exit examination 
legislation is firmly within the definition of strong and comprehensive legislation. 
I suspect that not only does a state have to be under Democratic control in order to 
be likely to pass exit examination legislation, but this control must also be highly unified, 
or without significant9 Republican presence.   
 
Informed by current party data available in the states surrounding exit 
examination policy and party ideologies more broadly, my second hypothesis is:   
 
B.1) States whose governor and state legislature affiliate with the 
Democratic Party are more likely than states whose governor and state 
legislature affiliate with the Republican Party to enact a high school exit 
examination. 
 
                                                
9 Here I define “significant” as equal or in some way serving as a rival to Democratic presence.  
A state with a Democratic governor and a Republican legislature is not unified in my study, nor is 
a state with a Republican governor and a Democratic legislature.   
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Without treating party unity as a third independent hypothesis, I wish to explore 
party unity as an addendum to, and within the context and analysis of Hypothesis B.  
Stated concisely: 
 
B.2) States whose governor and state legislature both affiliate with the 
Democratic Party are more likely than states whose governor and legislature 
affiliate with differing or split parties to enact a high school exit examination. 
 
Methods 
 
 This study entails a 50-state analysis of state education governance and policy.  
By including every state,10 this research provides an outlook on state education leadership 
across the country.  Similarities across state models have implications for government 
structure and partisan policies.  If the above hypotheses hold true, then one might be able 
to predict the direction of education policy in a state that is led with a particular structure 
and by a particular party.  More broadly, results of this study may reveal a move toward 
common policy behaviors among all states, in the event of great governance and policy 
similarities across the country, or conversely, results may indicate a pattern of highly 
regionalized education governance systems.    
In order to operationalize the variables more explicitly, I divide this project into 
two smaller research questions, each testing one of my hypotheses.  In both models the 
                                                
10  I have omitted the District of Columbia from this study.  While DC does have its own exam 
policies and its own education governance systems, the mayor holds different responsibilities 
from other states’ governors.  Additionally, unlike in other states, the federal government directly 
oversees DC’s legislature, known as the Council of the District of Columbia. 
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dependent variable is the presence of a passed exit examination policy.  Measuring this 
variable requires examining policy in all states in order to determine how many out of 50 
have at some point in their history passed exit exam legislation. 
 
In Hypothesis A, my independent variable is the structure of state education 
governance systems.  The term “structure” in this study specifically refers to 
centralization, and Hypothesis A attempts to enumerate and analyze the degree of 
centralization within each state’s education governance system.  In order to measure 
education governance I examine the chief offices and organizations driving education 
policy within each state.  Each state’s laws regarding education governance structure are 
publicly available online either through the SBOE website or through the state legislature 
website.   
Based on extant state governance literature, I have selected the following key 
governance players to study within each state11: 
 
• The governor 
• The chief state school officer [CSSO]  
• The state board of education [SBOE] 
 
The relationship among these entities varies by state, so it necessarily follows that 
                                                
11 I have intentionally omitted the state legislature from this model because in every state 
the legislature is an elected body with no apparent avenue for significant governor influence or 
oversight in the realm of education.  While the legislature serves a central role in policy 
enactment, this role is never under the direct purview of the governor in the same way that the 
CSSO and SBOE are in certain states.  The function of the state legislature is explored and tested 
in the subsequent hypothesis. 
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the degree of education governance centralization varies by state.  My first step, therefore, 
is to examine within each state how these three units relate to one another, whether this 
be through internal election, appointment, or the electorate selecting some or all of the 
units independently.  The key to determining the level of centralization rests in the role of 
the governor.  A governor who is empowered to appoint both the SBOE members and the 
CSSO represents the most highly centralized state education governance model in the 
United States.  Conversely, a governor serving in a state where the electorate chooses the 
SBOE and CSSO represents the least centralized state education governance model.  
There exist a variety of governance structures between these extremes, and all models 
will appear in this study.  
Using data compiled from the National Association of State Boards of Education 
and some supplemental research through state code as needed, I assembled the necessary 
data to assign each state as a value from 0-3 on a scale of decentralized to centralized.  A 
value of 0 represents the most decentralized governance model existing in the United 
States.  The governor has no direct authority over the selection of either the SBOE or the 
CSSO.  The selection of these parties rests exclusively in statewide elections or in 
selection by state leadership bodies not under direct gubernatorial purview.  States with a 
value of 1 are the next step closer to a centralized model but still rest handedly within a 
decentralized system.  The governor in these states may directly appoint either the SBOE 
or the CSSO but the other is chosen in a statewide election.  Whereas the governor has 
clear authority in selecting one of these entities, that authority is entirely stripped for the 
selection of the other.   
A value of 2 offers governors a greater deal of control over the selection process 
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of state education officials but still does not reach the fully centralized form.  Governors 
of these states directly appoint either the SBOE or the CSSO and indirectly affect the 
selection of the other.  The nuanced term “indirectly” can have several forms.  The 
governor might be one of a handful of persons to appoint members of the SBOE, for 
example, or the governor might have full authority to appoint all members of the SBOE, 
and the SBOE in turn is charged with CSSO selection.  While state governance models 
with a 2 value can take several forms, and thus be somewhat perplexing, they are distinct 
from states coded as 1 because no statewide election is involved, and distinct from states 
coded as 3 because they do not represent full centralization and interdependence among 
the offices.   
Finally, governors serving in a state with a value of 3 have full authority to 
independently appoint both the SBOE and the CSSO.  Even if the SBOE may suggest a 
limited number of CSSO candidates, the final decision rests exclusively with the 
governor.  Gubernatorial appointments followed by Senate approval fall into this 
category, as the governor retains full authority to select each candidate for consideration.   
For states that have approved exit examinations I have coded them as the 
governance model within which they operated at the time the examination policy was 
passed.  Among these states with exit examinations, all models exist currently as they did 
at the time the exit examination policy was passed with the exceptions of Mississippi, 
New Mexico, and Texas, which have all since granted their governors a more centralized 
role in the selection of the CSSO and the SBOE.  Using the aforementioned values from 
0-3 I have classified each state as follows.   
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0: AL, CO, KS, MI, MS, NE, NM, NY, SC, TX, UT, WI12 
1: AZ, CA, GA, ID, IN, LA, MT, NV, NC, ND, OH, OK, WA, WY 
2: AK, AR, CT, FL, HI, IL, KY, MD, MA, MO, OR, RI, WV 
3: DE, IA, ME, MN13, NH, NJ, PA, SD, TN, VT, VA 
 
~~~ 
 
 In Hypothesis B, my independent variable is the partisan affiliation of selected 
state education governance players, as enumerated below.  This hypothesis specifically 
tests the partisan influence of the following two entities on exit examination policy in the 
United States: 
 
• The governor 
• The state legislature 
 
I have chosen to include the state legislature in Hypothesis B because the 
legislature serves universally as the lead policymaking body in each state.  While some 
degree of policymaking authority exists in other state institutions, the legislature 
represents the strongest available mix of policy authority and partisan influence, and is 
thus an essential variable in examining the impact of partisanship on state exit 
examination policy.  
                                                
12  Wisconsin does not have a State Board of Education, so its code is based only upon the CSSO 
selection process. 
13  Minnesota does not have a State Board of Education, so its code is based only upon the CSSO 
selection process. 
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In an effort to maintain focus on partisan affiliation I have intentionally omitted 
the SBOE and CSSO in this model.  Party affiliation data is not available for these 
entities in all 50 states, and many SBOE members and CSSOs assume their titles on an 
explicitly nonpartisan platform.  Indeed, the Council of Chief State School Officers offers 
no party affiliation information on its website, which may suggest a reduced role for 
partisan association among all CSSOs.   
My focus on the governor and state legislature highlights the most visible partisan 
influence on education policy in the United States.  In studying this model it is essential 
to note the date of adoption for all exit examination policies passed in the United States.  
Rather than evaluating the partisan leanings of a given state in general, this study 
specifically seeks to assess the particular partisan environment as a state codifies exit 
examination policy as law.  By this logic, an exit examination policy passed in 1990 
requires a study of the state-level partisan environment in 1990. 
Party affiliation of the governor is available from state ballots and from the 
National Governors Association [NGA].  State legislature party information is available 
from the National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL] for 2008 onward and in a 
legislative party history book by Michael J. Dubin (2007) for earlier years.     
 
For the purposes of this project it is imperative to calculate total Democratic and 
Republican influence in both exit examination states and non-exit examination states in 
each year from 1975-2012.  A calculation of the partisan political environment in all 
states for all years included in this study will provide the necessary context for testing the 
relationship between partisanship and exit examination policy in the United States.  With 
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this data it will not only be possible to determine the party, if there is one, that is 
generally associated with passing exit examination policies, but also the likelihood of 
officials in both parties to pass such a policy in a state that does not yet have one.  The 
results, as expressed in the above fashion, will therefore indicate both the past and likely 
future direction of exit examination policy, at least as it relates to partisan state leadership. 
   
Finally, Hypothesis B.2 specifically merits an analysis of unified and divided 
Democratic and Republican presence in state governance systems.  Measuring how 
unified or divided a state is requires using the above data from the NGA, NCSL, and 
Dubin (2007) and noting which states have passed exit examination legislation under full 
partisan control or split partisan control.  I measure “unified” governance as all states that 
have passed exit examination legislation under a governor and state legislature of the 
same political party, and I measure “divided” governance as all states that have passed 
exit examination legislation under a governor and state legislature of varying partisan 
identities.  Regardless of gubernatorial party affiliation, any state with a split party 
legislature is classified as a state under divided governance. 
 
Results & Analysis 
 
 Findings suggest that a centralized education governance system is no more likely 
than a decentralized system to support exit examination legislation.  Figure 3 represents 
governance strength and exit examination policy adoption by year, and it is clear in this 
graph that the degree of education governance centralization in a given state does not 
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significantly correlate with exit examination policy approval over time.  Table 1 
corroborates this finding, demonstrating the randomness with which states have adopted 
exit examinations under a particular governance structure.  Table 1 additionally helps to 
show that this randomness has persisted over time. 
**Figure 3 Here** 
**Table 1 Here** 
 Overall, the percentage of non-exit examination states within each of the levels of 
centralization closely mirrors the percentage of exit examination states within each of the 
levels of centralization (see Table 2).  A chi-squared test on these data reveals a highly 
statistically insignificant relationship between how centralized a state is and exit 
examination policy existence, thus further signifying a lack of correlation in any direction 
between centralized governance and exit examination policy production.    
**Table 2 Here** 
 The chi-squared test assesses how the degree of centralization in a state (0-3) 
varies among states with an exit examination policy and total states.  In Table 3 the 
expected frequencies are calculated using the percentages that each of the degrees of 
centralization is present in all states.  The observed frequencies indicate the number of 
states with exit examination policies that are governed under each of the four 
centralization structures.  A statistically significant chi-squared test would imply that the 
type of centralization models found in certain states is in some way related to having an 
exit examination policy.  Within the context of Hypothesis A, a statistically significant 
result could led support to the idea that more centralized states are overall more likely to 
be affiliated with exit examination policy.  As is indicated in Table 3, however, the 
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difference between exit examination states and total states is not statistically significant 
with a p-value of .7336.  In fact it is possible to say that this finding is hugely 
insignificant.  Stated concisely, the distribution of centralization models among the 50 
states is approximately equivalent to the distribution of centralization models among only 
states with an exit examination.  Centralized governance is not a strong indicator of exit 
examination policy. 
**Table 3 Here** 
 
 Additional analysis on the most centralized and most decentralized states reveals a 
surprisingly even relationship between these types of governance models.  Among all 30 
states that adopted an exit examination policy between 1975 and 2012, 60% of these were 
partially or fully decentralized and 40% were partially or fully centralized.  Viewing 
these results as a sort of prediction model for future exit examination policies, it is 
possible to contend that there is a near equal chance of an exit examination policy state 
being affiliated with either centralized or decentralized governance.  It would not be 
imprudent to additionally articulate that in the past exit examinations have slightly more 
often been passed under decentralized leadership, though this finding is not statistically 
significant.   
 
 Studying the entire history of exit examination policies in the United States allows 
analysis to additionally explore a relationship between centralization and policy 
throughout time.  Results as displayed in Figure 3 and Table 1 reveal a negligible impact 
of time on the variables, as evidenced in the widespread frequencies of each 
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centralization model throughout the 36 years of policy activity.  Although the promise of 
a prediction model already seems futile considering the above analysis of states that have 
passed exit examination policy, a trend of increased centralization among states in recent 
years, for example, may have provided the requisite inferential data to suggest a recent or 
growing trend toward greater centralization when discussing the passage of exit 
examination policies.  But because no one model (0-3) is more or less active within any 
given cluster of dates, it is not possible to deduce such a trend. 
 
 As a final way of assessing Hypothesis A, I examined if there may exist a 
geographical relationship among the levels of centralization, and if in turn this 
relationship extends into the exit examination policy space.  Figure 4 represents the 
variance in education governance structure models overall, wherein the randomness of 
model dispersion is highly evident.  Figure 5 confines the study of education governance 
models only within exit examination states, and here the governance models are similarly 
randomly distributed.  Figures 4 and 5 render visual the data that Table 2 put forth: 
centralization models are as randomly distributed throughout exit examination states as 
they are throughout all states.  What the maps add to this conclusion is a spatial 
dimension, and through this we may again return to an exploration of a possible 
prediction model.  Because there is no strong clustering of centralization models in any 
given area of the country, and because the spread of centralization models is similar 
among exit examination states and non-exit examination states alike, it is not possible to 
reliably predict the passage of exit examination policy based on where in the country a 
given state is located. 
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**Figure 4 Here** 
**Figure 5 Here** 
 
~~~ 
 
 Results of Hypothesis B suggest that partisan control is a more reliable indicator 
of exit examination policy passage rates than centralized governance.  Of the 30 states 
that have passed exit examination legislation at some point in their histories, half of these 
(15) were under unified Democratic leadership and three were under unified Republican 
leadership.14,15  The remainders were under divided leadership.  To reiterate the 
distinction between unified and divided partisan leadership, unified leadership refers to 
the incidence of both the governor and state legislature belonging to the same political 
party.  When comparing partisan state leadership in this way, unified Democratic states 
were five times more likely than unified Republican states to pass an exit examination 
policy.  The figures discussed in this section (Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9) illustrate the 
relationship between partisan state education governance and exit examination policy 
passage both over time and geographically. 
  Although any state governance system with varying partisan influence is 
classified as being under divided leadership, it is possible for some states to be more 
divided than others.  A state with a governor and legislature each affiliating with a 
different party, Democrat or Republican, represents the most highly divided state, as each 
party exerts a stable presence against the opposing party.  A state with a split legislature, 
                                                
14 States under Democratic leadership at the time exit examination policy passed: AL, AR, CA, 
FL, GA, LA, MD, MS, NV, NJ, NC, OR, SC, TX, WA 
15 States under Republican leadership at the time exit examination policy passed: AZ, ID, UT 
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while still under divided control, necessarily affords one party more of a presence than 
the other because the governor will share his or her partisan affiliation with one of the 
branches of the state legislature.  Thus, the former model represents states under pure 
divided leadership, and the latter model represents states under partisan divided 
leadership. 
 Of the 12 states that passed exit examination legislation under divided leadership, 
only six16 of these were under pure divided leadership with neither Democratic nor 
Republican influence greater than the other.  The remaining six17 divided leadership 
states were under divided Democratic leadership in some form, indicating that the 
Democratic Party enjoyed a decidedly greater presence than the Republican Party.  In 
each of these six states, the governor was a Democrat working with a split legislature.  
While it could be argued that these six states fall under the category of split control 
because the legislature is split, I suggest that the incidence of a Democratic governor 
combined with dual party advocacy in the legislature amounts to an overall greater 
Democratic presence, hence the classification of these six states as partisan divided 
leadership.   
 After accounting for Democratic influence beyond just unified Democratic 
leadership, overall Democratic presence increases to 21 of the 30 states that have passed 
exit examination policies and has therefore proven to be seven times more likely than 
Republican leadership (three states), unified or divided, to pass an exit examination 
policy. 
                                                
16 States under fully divided, or split leadership at the time exit examination policy passed: AK, 
CT, MA, MN, TN, VA 
17 States under divided Democratic leadership at the time exit examination policy passed: DE, IN, 
NM, NY, OH, OK  
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 Figures 6 and 7 indicate the relationship over time between state partisanship and 
exit examination policy with respect to the governor and the legislature, respectively.  
Because these graphs span from 1975-2012 it is possible to explore the possible 
correlation, if any, between partisanship and exit examination policy over time.  It is 
evident in both Figure 6 and Figure 7 that Republican governors and legislatures are 
overall randomly distributed among all remaining Democratic states that have enacted an 
exit examination policy.  There is little evidence, then, to support any sort of longitudinal 
trend in exit examination policy adoption.  Rather, the better conclusion is that 
Democrats are considerably more frequently affiliated with passing exit examination 
policies, and this conclusion has withstood the test of time.  There is no point in history 
where the Republican Party has been more frequently affiliated with passing exit 
examination policy. 
**Figure 6 Here** 
**Figure 7 Here** 
 
 Exploring geographical variance is particularly wise when discussing state 
partisanship because despite the overwhelming movement toward increased party 
nationalization for both Democrats and Republicans, any strong regional trends would 
pose an obstacle for the generalizability of my findings across the United States.  Figure 8 
combines the partisan affiliation of each state’s governor and legislature, and uses this to 
map the spread of states that passed an exit examination policy under aggregate 
Democratic, Republican, or split control.  
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 Figure 9 adjusts Figure 8 to account for divided control.  Rather than labeling all 
states under some sort of split control as “split,” Figure 9 labels as Democratic all split 
states under divided Democratic control and labels as Republican all split states under 
divided Republican control.  States with seemingly even control between the two parties, 
such as states with a Republican governor and fully Democratic state legislature, remain 
as split (fully divided) states on this map.  With this adjustment, the number of states 
under Democratic control increases to 21.  Among the 30 states that have passed exit 
examinations, these 21 states seem to be randomly distributed across the country.  
Conversely, the only states labeled as being under Republican control, unified or divided, 
at the time their exit examination policy was passed remain as Idaho, Utah, and Arizona.   
**Figure 8 Here** 
**Figure 9 Here** 
 
Discussion 
 
 Overall, results from Hypothesis A demonstrate that centralized governance does 
not correlate with exit examination policy on a statistical, temporal, or geographical level.  
The insignificant relationship between centralization and exit examination policy 
suggests that we can fully reject my first hypothesis.  A highly centralized education 
governance model is an unreliable predictor of exit examination policy success.  
Aggregate data as collected in Table 2 demonstrate the weakness of the relationship, and 
time-sensitive data as collected in Figure 3 and Table 1 show that there is not a consistent 
relationship when looking to specific time periods.  Finally, Figures 4 and 5 reveal that 
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no one model of centralization is significantly more common than another throughout the 
United States.  It is possible, therefore, to conclude with assertion that the relationship 
between centralized education governance and exit examination policy is weak.  Further, 
the persistent lack of a correlation between governance and testing data over time and 
from a geographical standpoint corroborate the conclusion that governance is not an 
effective predictor of exit examination policy success. 
 Network Theory, despite its widespread support in the literature, does not seem to 
provide a reliable means to examine the history of exit examination legislation.  
Policymakers throughout the United States have enacted exit examination legislation with 
comparable frequency, regardless of how centralized their state may have been.  Henig’s 
(2009) research suggests increased education policy production in highly centralized 
states, and as is the case with the more general Network Theory, my data do not support 
this supposed policy growth.   
 Perhaps when discussing “policy,” Henig and others treated the word as an 
umbrella term related to the aggregate number of bills drafted and passed across all issue 
areas, or across all issue areas within education.  If so, it is important to explore why 
Network Theory does not extend into exit examination legislation.  There are several 
questions to ask in order to help orient further research into why Network Theory may 
not be a suitable model for the analysis of exit examination policy production in the 
United States.  Some of these questions appear below. 
 Is it inappropriate to use a concept like Network Theory to zoom in so specifically 
to one issue, such as exit examinations?  This question is an important one, as it addresses 
the importance of scope and specificity in analyzing research results through a particular 
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theoretical lens.  It is possible that Network Theory is a highly dependable philosophy 
when attempting to analyze policy production overall in a highly centralized system, but 
the theory breaks down for highly specific issue areas.  If this is indeed the case, then I 
would be curious to know where exactly Network Theory weakens: education policies, 
accountability policies within education, exit examination policies specifically, or 
somewhere in the middle.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore Network 
Theory in such depth, but perhaps the answer to why Network Theory served as such a 
poor predictor for exit examination policy production lies within this sort of exploration. 
 What type of policy is an exit examination?  Many of the scholars cited in this 
research discuss the relationship between centralized state governance and educational 
policy outcomes (Mokher 2010; Henig 2009; Manna and Harwood 2011; McIntosh 2012).  
While an exit examination is most relevant to students and schools, there may exist a 
better way to analyze exit examination policy than as a type of education policy 
specifically.  It may be, for example, more prudent to view exit examination legislation as 
accountability legislation or merely as a reflection of a desire for increased data structures 
within states.  If either of these possibilities proves to be valid then it would be improper 
to analyze Network Theory in the sole context of education.  Network Theory, in other 
words, may be exceptionally relevant to states passing education policies but not so for 
states wishing to pass legislation related to overall accountability or a desire for more 
state-level data.   
 The most significant takeaway from testing Hypothesis A is that centralized 
education governance does not have a relationship with exit examination policy.  While 
this finding contradicts what might be expected in the literature, it is important to 
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consider why Network Theory was a poor lens through which to interpret exit 
examination policymaking.  The questions and subsequent discussions above address 
these considerations, focusing specifically on different ways to investigate exit 
examination policy as it relates to state education governance structure. 
 
~~~ 
 
 Results from Hypothesis B indicate that there is indeed a positive relationship 
between state Democratic partisan affiliation and exit examination policy.  This 
relationship endures when examined statistically, temporally, and geographically.  
Democratic exit examination states outnumber Republican exit examination states 15 to 
three, and this relationship increases to 21 to three when expanding research to states 
under divided Democratic and divided Republican control.  Historically as well, 
Democrats have consistently passed exit examination policies more frequently than 
Republicans.  Finally, exit examination states under Democratic leadership are spread 
across all regions of the United States, which suggests that a) there do not seem to be any 
significant geographical trends with regard to exit examination policies and the partisan 
affiliation of state leaders passing said policies; and b) partisan policy activity does not 
seem to be restricted to certain regions of the country, which is an idea widely supported 
in the consulted literature.   
 With that said, Figures 8 and 9 each beg the question of why the only three states 
that passed an exit examination policy under Republican control are adjacent to one 
another. There is a notable gap in exit examination policy in the mountain and plains 
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states, which merits some exploration and analysis.  Idaho, Utah, and Arizona serve as an 
unexpected border between the west coast, which is comprised entirely of states that have 
passed an exit examination policy, and the large section mountain and plains states, 
which is comprised entirely of states that have never passed such a policy.  With 
occasional exceptions, most of these non-exit examination states have a sustained history 
with Republican Party affiliation (Dubin 2007).  Perhaps Idaho, Utah, and Arizona 
represent states in this region under similarly Republican control that passed exit 
examination policy because they are more closely linked, at least geographically, to west 
coast states that approved exit examination policies under unified Democratic leadership.  
While regional partisanship has been increasingly less prevalent in favor of greater party 
nationalization, a geographical cause for partisan exit examination passage may still be 
possible.  Alternatively, although the geographical proximity of Idaho, Utah, and Arizona 
is a compelling circumstance meriting some further exploration, it is possible that the 
regional concentration of Republican-approved exit examination policies is but a 
coincidence.  Because exit examination legislation approved under Democratic leadership 
is so widespread with no overwhelming regional cohesion, I am inclined to believe that 
Idaho, Utah, and Arizona are indeed random Republican states that happened to approve 
exit examination legislation regardless of their geographical proximity.  Perhaps a deeper 
exploration of a potential geographical relationship is a compelling topic for further study 
in future research on education policy in the United States, but to effectively test this type 
of regional party influence, particularly with regard to exit examination policies 
specifically, would be an undertaking inappropriate for the scope of this present research. 
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 Overall, while it is perhaps most conclusive to compare the effect of unified 
Democratic versus unified Republican state leadership on exit examination policy, it 
would be imprudent to not recognize any other partisan impact, regardless of whether it is 
perhaps smaller in scope or less certain than unified partisan policy behavior.  
Distinguishing unified from divided partisan leadership offers an opportunity to 
underscore the impact of Democratic leadership at different levels of party strength.   
 Although the results of this research may appear to strongly support my second 
hypothesis that Democrats are most strongly affiliated with exit examination policy, it is 
important to also assess Democratic and Republican leadership in non-exit examination 
states in order to make country-wide comparisons.  Overwhelming Democratic leadership 
in exit examination policy production means little if there exists overwhelming 
Democratic leadership at the state level on the whole.  Accurately construing the effect of 
partisanship on policy, then, requires comparing levels of partisan state leadership overall 
to levels of partisan activity with exit examination policies more specifically.  If the 
proportions align then partisanship may play an insignificant role in policy production, 
but if they differ significantly then it may be possible to determine which party exercises 
proportionally more control over a policy area than would be expected if each party 
contributed comparably to certain policies. 
 In order to set up my study to allow for country-wide partisan comparisons, I 
continue my analysis with non-exit examination states.  Figure 10 displays the number of 
states not passing exit examination policies every year according to policy affiliation.  
Looking at the earlier years of enactment, non-exit examination states under Democratic 
control far outnumber their counterparts under Republican control.  Given this fact, an 
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exaggerated Democratic presence in exit examination policy is expected.  A higher 
frequency of Democratic state leadership naturally predicts a higher frequency of 
Democrats in the states supporting exit examination policies.  In order to test if the 
partisanship variable is salient, then more non-exit examination states under Democratic 
leadership should be adopting exit exams than non-exit examination states under 
Republican leadership. 
 Figure 10 reveals that over time non-exit examination states under Republican 
control start to increase in frequency just as non-exit examination states under 
Democratic control start to decrease in frequency.  The trend lines in Figure 10 are telling, 
as they indicate whether non-exit examination states are more or less likely to become 
exit examination states given their party affiliation.  Because the Republican trend line 
has a positive slope, therein is implied that more non-exit examination states under 
Republican control each year remain without an exit examination than adopt one, which 
is the exact opposite trend reflected in the steeper negative slope of states under 
Democratic control.   
**Figure 10 Here** 
 
 With this data, it is possible to deduce that a non-exit examination state under 
Democratic control is more likely to adopt an exit examination policy.  This bolsters the 
first finding discussed in Hypothesis B analysis, which reveals that most states approving 
an exit examination policy were under the majority leadership of Democrats.   
 Taken together, these two conclusions demonstrate that the Democratic Party is 
much more friendly than the Republican Party toward exit examination policies across 
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the United States.  Not only have most policies been enacted under Democratic 
leadership, but a state under Democratic control is overall more likely than a state under 
Republican control to propose and approve such a policy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This study centers on the relationships between centralized governance and exit 
examination policy, and between partisan governance and exit examination policy.  In 
testing Hypotheses A and B, this research also examines the potential effect of time on 
both centralization and partisanship.  Including exit examination policy data for all 50 
states from the years 1975-2012 allows for a comprehensive look at the effects of 
centralization and partisanship on policy throughout the entire history and geography of 
exit examinations. 
 Overall, my hypotheses yield results of different strength and significance.  
Findings for Hypothesis A, concerning centralization, are weak and therefore serve as a 
poor predictor for the future of exit examination policy development.  Highly centralized 
state education leadership is almost exactly as likely as highly decentralized leadership to 
pass exit examination policy.  Network Theory, and other similar theories as outlined in 
the literature and theory, do not seem to apply to exit examination policy.  Perhaps 
Network Theory does not extend to exit examinations or high-stakes education policy, or 
perhaps the theory is flawed or incomplete.  It is beyond the scope of this research to 
explore and perhaps conclude why Network Theory did not effectively predict the 
environments most conducive to exit examination policy, but it is certain that there is a 
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disconnect between the literature studied in this paper and the results of my first 
hypothesis.   
 McIntosh (2012) claims that certain states have faced policy challenges related to 
centralized governance in the development of exit examination policy, yet my results 
strongly suggest that states have consistently passed policies regardless of these alleged 
challenges.  Perhaps these “challenges” refer to additional time for debate, discussion, 
and policy drafting, but the overall rate of exit examination policy passage has not 
seemed to change based on how centralized a given state’s education leaders are.  If these 
challenges that McIntosh references are indeed present, results from my research would 
suggest that they are not so devastating as to prevent or impede exit examination policy 
production. 
 While Hypothesis A is overall ineffectual, my failure to reject the null 
hypothesis18 has important implications for the future of exit examination policy 
development. The legislation is not dependent upon or even correlated with strong 
centralized leadership, so in theory any state’s education leaders have the same chance of 
passing exit examination legislation as any other leaders working in any other governance 
structure.  Furthermore, results of this research reveal that a governor with a great degree 
of direct control over the education leaders in a certain state is no more likely to be able 
to pass exit examination policy than a governor who has limited or negligible control 
over the education leaders in another state.  In other words, a highly centralized system 
does not automatically set the stage for high-accountability legislation, as Network 
Theory seems to suggest. 
                                                
18 The null hypothesis in opposition to Hypothesis A is: centralized leadership has no significant 
effect on a state’s likelihood of passing exit examination legislation. 
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 Results from my Hypothesis B partisanship study are strong and demonstrate a 
highly significant relationship between Democratic state leadership and exit examination 
policy.  In addition to revealing a clear and powerful connection between Democratic 
leadership and exit examination policy passage, my results provide the support for a 
prediction model concerning the future of exit examination policy enactment.  Examining 
the policy behaviors of states without active exit examination policies reveals that 
Democrats are likely to pass an exit examination policy in future years, whereas 
Republicans are likely to avoid such a policy.  The relationship between the trend lines in 
Figure 10 best illustrates this dichotomy between Democratic and Republican partisan 
control in states.  
 Because the Hypothesis B findings strongly bolster much of the extant literature 
on the relationship between partisan state politics and policy outcomes, future research 
may explore if state partisanship shares a significant relationship with other high-stakes 
education policies overseen at the state level.  Variables of interest include whether or not 
students have access to alternative routes to receive their diploma, the rise of end-of-
course exams over comprehensive exit exams, and how many subjects an exit 
examination tests for proficiency.  State governance partisanship may very well play a 
substantial, if not leading role in these sorts of initiatives, particularly as they relate to 
educational accountability.   
 Other variables to explore include the role of geography and, by extension, 
regional policy diffusion, and how well exit examination policies persist after their initial 
enactment.  Figure 2 reveals two separate drops, when Utah and North Carolina each 
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decided to abolish their exit examination policy.19  A deep exploration into what 
motivated these decisions, accompanied by a detailed account of the policy environment 
at the time of policy revocation, may reveal a new and important dimension for the role 
of partisanship in policy.   
 
 Ultimately, this research has noteworthy implications for both state education 
governance and standardized testing policy across the country.  As multi-state initiatives, 
such as the Common Core State Standards and the PARCC and SmarterBalanced testing 
consortia, begin to gain momentum, the results of my research may inform the future 
direction and likely success of these programs.  As of yet, for example, exit examinations 
do not explicitly exist within the goals of any of these initiatives, but I expect that states 
under Democratic control will be more inclined to incorporate such a policy should the 
opportunity arise.  Similarly, I expect these new initiatives to be more readily approved 
within states that currently use exit examinations, although if they are under Republican 
leadership at the time these initiatives are passed, I cannot extend my full confidence.   
 While results of my research afford me a certain degree of confidence in the 
analysis and predictions related to the future of standardized testing, this confidence is 
limited by virtue of the narrow scope of this paper.  Even if Democratic states may 
express more of an affinity toward exit examination proposals within the Common Core 
framework, my findings are not comprehensive enough to offer a prediction model for 
the future of cut score setting practices, the nature of high school standardized tests that 
are not exit examinations, or the potential roles that states may fill throughout the 
                                                
19 In early 2006 Utah abolished exit examinations under unified Republican leadership; In late 
2010 North Carolina abolished exit examinations under unified Democratic leadership. 
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development and delivery of standardized tests.  Each of these topics is highly relevant in 
today’s education environment, and perhaps future research on the relationship between 
state education governance and student testing will begin to address some of these 
nuances and practices that will come to define public education in the 21st century. 
 Exit examinations are a growing and evolving phenomenon, and upcoming policy 
initiatives may usher them even more strongly into education policy discourse.  This 
study only begins to explore the possible role of exit examination policy in the United 
States, and future research on the issue is highly salient in our 21st century age of 
education accountability. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Map of all States that have Passed Exit Examination Legislation 
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Figure 2: Active Exit Examination Policies by Year 
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Figure 3:  Governance Strength and Exit Examination Policy 
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Table 1: Number of States that Adopted Exit Examination Policy, by degree of 
centralization and by year 
 
 
 
KEY: 
 
0 = Decentralized 
1 = Somewhat Decentralized 
2 = Somewhat Centralized 
3 = Centralized 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Totals: 
 
 
 
 
Level 0 1 2 3 
# States 7 11 7 5 
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Table 2: Comparing Governance Structure among States 
with and without Exit Examination Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Degree of 
Centralization 
Exit Examination 
States 
Non 
Exit Examination 
States 
Total States 
0 
(Decentralized) 7 23.3% 5 25% 12 24% 
1 
(Somewhat 
Decentralized) 
11 36.7% 3 15% 14 28% 
2 
(Somewhat 
Centralized) 
7 23.3% 6 30% 13 26% 
3 
(Centralized) 5 16.7% 6 30% 11 22% 
 30 (100%) 20 (100%) 50 (100%) 
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Table 3: Comparing Observed and Expected Values for the Number of States that 
have Passed Exit Examination Legislation within the Four Degrees of Centralization 
(“expected” values derived from percentages in “Total States” column) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chi-square = 1.280 (d.f. = 3; p = .7336) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Degree of Centralization Exit Examination States  (observed || expected) Total States 
0 
(Decentralized) 7 7.2 12 24% 
1 
(Somewhat Decentralized) 11 8.4 14 28% 
2 
(Somewhat Centralized) 7 7.8 13 26% 
3 
(Centralized) 5 6.6 11 22% 
 30 (100%) 50 (100%) 
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Figure 4: Map of Governance Strength in All States 
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Figure 5: Map of Governance Strength in States that have Passed Exit Examination 
Policy 
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Figure 6: Partisanship and Exit Examination Policy 
(Governor) 
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Figure 7: Partisanship and Exit Examination Policy (Legislature) 
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Figure 8: Map of Partisanship in States that have Passed Exit Examination Policy  
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Figure 9: Adjusted Map of Partisanship in States that Have  
Passed Exit Examination Policy 
(all states under divided control recolored to reflect partisan affiliation) 
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Figure 10: States Without Exit Examinations, by Party Control 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Split-Party States Excluded from Model 
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